更至7902集
Telecommunications
AriyunHeilongjiang Province Beijing
220. X.X.235 Telecommunications 123. X.X.208 Unicom 久久免费看少妇高潮片A特黄 Since 2018, CNCERT has organized provincial sub-centers to carry out special treatment of attack resources in China in conjunction with local operators and cloud service providers. After six months of resource management and comprehensive analysis of the change trend of various attack resources in China, we found that the monthly active number of resources such as control end and broiler has a relatively obvious downward trend compared with 2017. The monthly addition rate and extinction rate of resources such as control end, cross-domain forged traffic source router and local forged traffic source router in the past three months have increased to a certain extent compared with the monthly average value in 2017, which means that the change speed of resources is accelerated and the stability of available resources is reduced. The monthly increase rate and extinction rate of reflection server resources in the past three months are unchanged compared with the monthly average value in 2017. The increase rate and extinction rate show a certain degree of decrease, which means that the amount of available resources is gradually decreasing. Specific trends in resources are as follows: Ariyun Does the code have only one exit and one entry (except for severe exception handling) Cross-domain forgery traffic involves the distribution of routers by province. Beijing accounts for the largest proportion, accounting for 12.4%, followed by Jiangsu and Shandong provinces. According to the statistics of the operators to which the router belongs, Unicom accounts for the largest proportion, accounting for 37.3%, Telecom for 31.6% and Mobile for 31.1%, as shown in Figure 15. Telecommunications Home OperatorShandong Province
Reflection Server Address